Truth and control in being and language by Krummel, J.
Truth And Control In Being And Language 
J. KRÜMMEL 
New School for Social Research 
Despite Heidegger's influence on Foucault, their vast differences bom in 
content and purpose should not be denied. However, in mis paper, I would 
like to explore the similarities they may hold—especially in their notions of 
language in its expression of "being". "Being" for Heidegger is the process of 
existence itself, the temporality of that which exists as it undergoes different 
transient formations—this process constituting its actuality as the movement 
of "presenting" into "unconcealment" (coming into being) and out of 
posit any conditions as Tying behind tKis temporal mutability— 
this movement itself constituting the "being of beings". Although Foucault's 
project is not that of an explicit ontology as Heidegger's is, he does speak 
about the various transmutations in the notions and uses of language and 
how these are related to the constitution of our finitude (as our being) in 
discourse2. Underlying this discursive finitude, Foucault hypothesizes that 
there is a struggle of forces competing for durability—to enter into the 
discursive network. This emergence into the discursive network, for 
Foucault, is the "event" of being, the emergence of a specific relation of 
forces, in its least complex and most durable form, resulting from a battle of 
forces. 
For both Heidegger and Foucault, this temporal movement of a 
transient event becomes artificially preserved as a "being"—an entity, thing, 
substance, object, essence, hypokeimenon, subjectum—persisting through-out 
its temporality as a superficially structured a-temporality—claiming tobe an 
"eternity" (at least for. the time being), differentiated and autonomous from 
its temporal existence.3 This "preservation" is accomplished in relation to 
1 According to Reiner Schürmann's excellent writings on Heidegger, being 
for Heidegger can be thus described in three different ways: "presenting" as 
the emergence into existence doubled with "absenting" as perishing out of 
existence, "presence" or "beingness" as the mode according to which the 
presenting is accomplished to linger for a while before absenting, and the 
entity that is "present" in accordance with the mode of presenting. 
Heidegger charges metaphysics with looking only to "presence" - the 
parousta (presence) of an idea for the phusts (emergence) of an ousia 
(substance) in Aristotle - as the ground of being, posited as an absolute. See 
Schürmann's book on Heidegger titled Heidegger on Being And Acting. 
2 By "discourse" or "discursivity", Foucault means the network or 
configurations of how and what we know and how we communicate this 
knowledge, constituting our own understanding of ourselves and the world, 
and limiting our way of existing in accordance with this understanding. On 
the surface level, such a configuration of knowledge seems to be absolute, 
thus gripping us in its hold as a "regime of truth . But hidden under its 
apparent rigidity, there lies its mutability due to the multiplicity and 
temporality of disparate elements constituting the claimed universality and 
eternity of any knowledge. 
3 The English translation of Heidegger's uses of the terms Sein as the process 
of "being' ("is") as a verb and Seiendes as the entity that "is" - "being" as a 
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noun - can be confusing. While some scholars have translated the prior 
sense of "being" as "Being" with a capital "B" in contrast to 'being" with a 
small "b" as the entity, I feel that the use of a capital "B" in English, makes 
Sein sound like some absolute entity or metaphysical principle designated 
by a pronoun, ruling other "beings". Instead, in this paper, for the most part, 
1 will use "being" to translate Sein as the process of be-ing, and "entity" or 
"thing" to translate Seiendes as mat which is". 
4 Forboth thinkers, naming would be an attempt at re-presenting that which 
is no longer present beyond its temporal "event" with a sign. The signifying 
name serves to retain the phenomenon beyond its temporality with an 
artificiality replacing the original which is no longer present. Moreover, it 
also serves to unify that which in its self may be a dispersed multiplicity of 
phenomena and phenomenal events into an individuality which can be 
conceptualized in accordance with a universal category as a particular 
example. However, the substantiating name serves to re-present the event 
only insofar as it distorts it as such oeyond its original temporality and 
plurality. The event is brought to us only through mediation distorting it 
mto a thing. Insofar as an immediate re-presentation of an event is 
impossible, it cannot be "named". 
language which constitutes our knowledge of being in terms of objects and 
concepts by the act of naming "that-which-cannot-be-named".4 But once 
thus named, the mutability of the event continues unbeknownst to us in 
accordance with the transformations of language covering over its 
temporality. This tendency of language—the crystallization or solidification 
of being as something durable—continues towards its totalizing self-closure 
wherein that which is posited as being present becomes preserved as an 
absolute mode of presence, resulting in the reign of a discursive truth 
regime, the historical rule of an epislemei for Foucault, an epoch of being for 
Heidegger. 
Before preceding, I would like to clarify my position and intention. 
While I am aware of the fundamental differences between the philosophy of 
Heidegger as an ontology of being and that of Foucault as an archaeology of 
knowledge and genealogy of power undertaken for the sake of cultural 
critique, as a part of a more extensive project, I am concentrating here on the 
interesting parallels in the conclusions reached by the two philosophies 
which make mem comparable. I see interesting converging points especially 
in their analyses of language as a mutability mutating through time. For 
Heidegger this proves to be an ontological history of being "unconcealing" 
itself from the indeterminate originariness of temporality into various 
determinate modes through history, while for Foucault, this proves to be a 
history of "truth" and knowledge-power formations constituting what we 
ourselves are and our knowledge of what we are with various techniques of 
power. The main difference would be the fact that while Heidegger is 
interested in formulating an ontology, Foucault is interested in looking at the 
limiting configurations which constitute what and how we are for the 
possibility of mutating beyond them. But while Heidegger's project is that 
of an ontology, since it looks at being as this very movement of temporal 
mutations—called "unconcealment" or "presenting"—one could say that he 
is looking at the same phenomena Foucault sees in his "critique". And for 
both, this proves to be a phenomenological destruction of metaphysical 
posits as being transient and contingently depending on their a priori 
temporality and irreducible plurality contrary to their claims. Therefore, 
while this paper is mainly about the similarities between the thoughts of 
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Heidegger and Foucault on language and being, this does not mean that I 
am unaware of their basic differences in purpose. • 
Let us first examine Heidegger's notion of being. For Heidegger, the 
primordiality of that which is, lies in its momentary comging-to-be and 
perishing ("presenting" and "absencing")-^the two-fold movement of an on-
going coming into being out of the veil of nothingness, behind which 
nothing is present and beyond which nothing is given in its totality. This 
presenting, as a revealing of a thing emerging into being, always requires a 
partial concealment which serves as an ordering limit to determine the 
revealed thing as that which endures while also concealing the transitoriness 
of its temporal endurance finitizing it. This presenting in time within the 
determining bounds of concealment, the temporal movement of partial 
disclosure in a momentary and transient coming-to-presence is the meaning 
of what the Greeks called "aletheia", commonly translated as "truth". And 
this movement of presenting out of concealment into unconcealment, is the 
being of entities. 
Since being, as this on-going process, is not a durable thing-in-itself 
lasting through its transitoriness, it can only be spoken through metaphor in 
language. However, this proves to be an inevitable distortion of being, the 
movement of unconverING, into a thing, designated with a name as that 
which was uncoverED.5 And the choice of one group of metaphors over 
another is important in that the interpretation of the meaning of being is 
Eroduced through that metaphorical insistence. In this way, for Heidegger, mguage necessarily accompanies being in its realization, crystallizing it into 
an enduring form as the entity appearing in its presenting. But for Foucault, 
this seeming arbitrariness of one set o f phenomena enduring as an entity 
instead of another set of phenomena, points to a "struggle for power" 
between conflicting forces. From out of such a conflict, the stronger forces 
are able to erupt into being as an enduring set at the expense of weaker sets 
of forces. Thus one could perhaps say that what Heidegger calls "being" is 
equivalent to what for Foucault is the event of forces erupting into being in 
accordance with discursive knowledge formations. For Foucault, this is the 
movement of an hypothetical eruption of forces in conflict, from out of 
which an economy of the least complex and most durable form of forces 
emerges. 
For Foucault, that which is, is this non-corporeal effectproduced by an 
intangible and inaccessible battle of forces colliding, mingling, seperating, 
and "forming a succession of links".6 From the initially local circumstances 
of events and forces, the "least complex local morphology" compatible with 
the circumstances is produced. However these forms, made up of 
momentary events of conflicting forces relating to one another, are unstable. 
To paraphrase what Lyotara says, they are nothing but "islands of 
determinism...in a constant flux due to changing circumstances."7 And 
language is one such form. Thus for Foucault, this eruptive entry of 
struggling forces, competing for durability, uniformity, simplicity, economy, 
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etc., making its emergence into language is "truth or being" revealed at the 
very exteriority of what we know.8 
Therefore, for both Heidegger and Foucault, whether it is from a conflict 
of forces or from concealment,Toeing entails a process -the very emergence of 
something which can be taken as a durable thing made known and 
recognizable through language naming it—an emerging which according to 
Heidegger, the Greeks called "poiesfe".9 However, since this movement in 
itself is not the permanence of a thing taken as an object, it is in need of an a-
temporal preservation in order to be taken as that which endures throughout 
its temporal presenting—a "thing".10 That is why Heidegger says that the 
essence of a thing lies m its temporal "gathering (legein, verb of logos) to 
make it "stay" through time. 1 1 And language is one way in which this 
gathering is accomplished. Thus "poesy' for Heidegger is the original 
essential form of language—the happening in which beings are linguistically 
disclosed. 
Being as poiesis and logos, also called the "saying" of being in 
Heidegger's later writings after Being And Time, is what accomplishes this 
unconcealment of an enduring being through difference. Through 
differentiation from the surrounding flux of becoming, the entity is made to 
stand as a particular thing preserved from out of its event of presenting. 
This is what Heidegger calls "apartness". In this apartness, the entity 
becomes limited and differentiated in "safety" from the rest of the flux of 
presenting.12 And through this cutting of a "trace" to determine it and 
differentiate it from others—the "(de)sign" of language as being's saying— 
definition or meaning is given to language within an "open clearing" 
(defined by borders) where things can appear, persist, and depart.*3 
According to this design unfolded into the "structure of manifold showing", 
we receive the measure of entities present as well as those absent through 
their apartness.14 
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In Foucault, language is related to the eventful conflict of forces from 
out of which it emerges to determine the existence of an entity with limits. 
From out of the pre-phenomenal nothingness, the "flashing" of this event 
lights up to determine the clarity of its own manifestation in accordance 
with the limit provided by the surrouding nothingness. Simultaneously, as 
in Heidegger, the existence of that which was shown in the light comes to be 
retained in language through the designation of its limiting difference from 
its surroundings." Through the designating constitution of a limit at the 
periphery of the flash, meaning is allowed to be affirmed in the emergence 
of what Foucault calls "statement". Through this affirmation, the mode of the 
event is determined and defined for our understanding as an identity 
different from that which lies outside of i t . 1 6 Thus while it defines the event, 
the statement simultaneously provides existential meaning to a group of 
signs to function as language. 1 7 And from within such a space of 
delimitation, a whole network of statements can emerge to provide a 
relation of signs with meaning so they can make sense within the context of 
the network—what Foucault calls "discourse". 1 8 In this way, by the 
functioning of signs as a repeatable materiality within discourse, the event 
becomes neutralized into a thing-concept" determined according to rules. 1 9 
This material existence of signs is viewed by both Heidegger and 
Foucault as being necessary for the determinate materialization of the 
"statement" or the "saying" of unconcealment, into language according to 
linguistic rules. For Foucault, the statement can only be received by our 
understanding through its determinate materialization, the spatio-temporal 
individuality of a group of signs controlling it and providing it with 
substance—in turn, the signs become provided with existential meaning.2 0 
And for Heidegger as well, logos can only be understood through the signs 
of sounds and mental experiences signifying things. 2 1 Thus, according to 
Foucault, the order upon which our understanding depends, can only exist 
in this linguistic "grid" of signs within which the contents of statements are 
constituted.22 And from within this discursive network, "constants" can 
emerge to neutralize the temporal event so that the statement can be 
repeatedly recognized in a general form 2 3 
Therefore, for both trunkers, the power to preserve the moment of being 
into its repeatability is related to language—in the act of naming through the 
word. As the vocal and written sign that names, Foucault says that the word 
(a noun by nature) captures an uncovered thing out of its discoveredness by 
designating its presentation in a representation.24 Only by virtue of such an 
act, can the movement of uncoverING for Heidegger, show itself as the 
uncoverED, a thing. Thus Heidegger says that the word gives being to the 
thing to establish it as a thing by way of its name. 2 5 The naming word 
1 5 Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression" in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice, p. 35-6. 
* Foucault, Vie Order of Things, p. 119, NY: Random House, 1970. 
1 7 Foucault, Archaeology Of Knowledge, p. 111-2; trs. by A.M. Sheridan Smith, 
NY: Pantheon Books, 1972. 
1 9 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 85-8 & 107-9. 
2 0 Foucault, Arcliaeology of Knowledge, p. 100-1. 
2 1 Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" in On the Way to Language, p. 97. 
2 2 Foucault, The Order of Tilings, p. xx; Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 114. 
2 3 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 101. 
2 * Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 97. 
2 5 Heidegger, 'The Nature ofLanguage", p. 62-3 & 86-7. 
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"holds, relates, and keeps the thing as thing" 2 6, making it "persist in (its) 
presence".27 According to Foucault, once the event becomes preserved 
through the naming noun, it loses its momentary intensity in favor of the 
rigidity making it more or less permanent.28 The word unifies the diversity 
and discontinuous elements of transient successions as an order of sequence 
placed upon a topological space where common names can be related to 
each other. 2 9 And only through this function of the naming noun, can a 
group of signs become a statement to hold the possibility of recurring within 
a discursive network.30 
Thus, for Foucault, once the event becomes specified with a name to be 
differentiated from others, it simultaneously comes to be controlled by a set 
of discursive truth-rules within which it is placed. This is made possible by 
the circulation of words as object-concepts and their relations with one 
another, setting up rules as a "space of co-existence", a "field of statements", 
according to which words, statements, concepts, objects, etc., become 
subjected.31 Thus as a complex network which governs the regularity of 
statements by delimiting a field of objects, discourse determines a 
perspective with norms fixed in accordance with i t 3 2 For the Heidegger of 
Being And Time, this discursive network called "Rede" is the mode of 
intelligibility underlying any interpretation or assertion33, the "existential-
ontological foundation of language.3 4 It is the totality of significations 
expressing the intelligibility of what Heidegger calls our "bemg-in-the-
world"—an expression which is constituted through language as its worldly 
being. 3 5 Only in accordance with this network providing definite and 
certain limits 3 6, can we structure and articulate our existential condition of 
our wordly being and our relating with other entities. 
Bom Heidegger and Foucault speak of this crystallization of mutability 
through its assimilation into a network of discursive rules establishing itself 
as absolute. For Foucault, with the establishment of rules according to 
which elements are subjected, a "space of extremity" comes to identify itself 
as a united discourse different from other discourses.3 7 And within this 
unity, the event becomes assimilated into a concept holding the illusion that 
it refers to a single object 3 8 Moreover, Heidegger would add that once a 
discursive topic becomes spoken in a "pronouncement" (Ausspruch), it 
becomes used as a standard measure for any further discourse concerning 
the topic, to determine its originary unconcealment according to the mere 
"appropriateness of facts".3 9 But while this network of names as a discursive 
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unity can claim autonomy, as Foucault says, it is never absolutely certain 
and is always limited by the silencing border determining it against 
everything that it is not 4 0 , preventing the name from ever verifying the 
factiäty of the event it claims to hold, resulting in an intelligibility which 
prohibits the immediacy of its claimed origin—a condition which either 
becomes ignored or displaced into the future by the positing of a telos. 
According to Foucault, within a period of time, such discursive borders can 
come to constitute a "corpus or knowledge" or episteme as a total set of 
discursive regularities, practices, and relations uniting a given period, 
presupposing the same fundamental perspective. 4 1 This notion is 
comparable to Heidegger's notion of an epoch of being. 
In spite of their repeatability within a period of time, the material 
contingency of signs, while making statements repeatable, also makes their 
meaning and identity modifiable, even if unintentionally. Since the 
discursive rules themselves are anonymous and historically determined in 
time and space for the definition of a given social, economic, geographical, 
linguistic area, Foucault says that a discourse is always finite and limited. 4 2 
But since it can never simultaneously occupy all the possibilities opened up 
to it, it is necessarilly incomplete, and its limiting rules are fluid. Because of 
this perpetual ^completion, a discourse can influence the dispersion of its 
inner-elements to move beyond the initial domain into new systems 
governed by distinct rules or to influence the birth of a new discourse.43 
In Foucault's notion of the fluid but limiting discourse, one can find 
converging points with Heidegger's notion of the unconcealment of being 
through an openess of discursivity. For Heidegger, we live within this 
openess of on-going unconcealment out of concealment, manifested through 
language defining limits to our world by seperating us from the unknown. 
Only in accordance with this space, can we speak and think. 4 4 For both 
thinkers, truth—its intelligibility—depends on this unintelligible limiting 
movement finitizing human thought captured in language. In this way, 
Heidegger's phrase of "being-in-the-worla" is related to his phrase "to-be-in-
a-language"—which is also "being-in-a-discourse'' for both thinkers: to live 
within a limited but flexible openess of meaning determined by the pre-
linguistic.4 5 For Foucault, this pre-linguistic event is what serves as the 
secret origin of a discourse, withdrawing its presence as an anonymous lack 
operating on the discursive field within which we act according to its 
operation.46 Therefore, in relation to the transformations of language 
through time, as being itself changes through its on-going unconcealment 
(for Heidegger) and discursive knowledge goes through tranformations (for 
Foucault), the defining limits of our own being continue to change as well. 
The susceptibility of signs to environmental differences in time, place, 
and matter, enables what Foucault calls the "statement" to go through 
transformations irreducible to any grammatical or logical form. 4 7 And tor 
Heidegger, as words become "vacuously" circulated through time and space, 
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via "gossiping" and "passing the word along" ("idle talk"), distributing the 
intended meaning of an event, their relation to being becomes forgotten and 
they become further displaced from their actual presenting through various 
interpretations—each claiming to refer to a determinate fact or a supposed 
ideality for self-justification as a pronouncement, while continuing to point 
to the lack of mis missing event no longer present. Thus as the standard 
measure, the pronouncement comes to dominate being in a plurality of 
different versions according to Heidegger 4 8 , and the event becomes 
articulated in multiple ways to give birth to different meanings according to 
Foucault. 4 9 Therefore, the guarrantee of an inter-subjective consensus 
between the different meanings attached to an identical word, representing 
something of which its presence is lacking, becomes lost. 
While the origin of an event no longer present for us becomes re-
presented within discursive domains, there also exist for Foucault, 
discursive borders separating us from the presence of not merely singular 
events but of a whole epistemic horizon. Such a border which historically 
limits us in time to differentiate our presence from previous discourses we 
can no longer be a part of, is called the "archive" (arche) by Foucault.5 0 The 
willful positing or the presence of an origin which we can no longer 
experience but would justify a given discourse, brings us closer to our 
archive temporally finitizing us. This eventually makes our temporal 
contingency explicit, and when we accept it along with the contingency of 
the posited origin, a dispersion of its meaning is set off from within the 
discourse to de-stabilize the discourse—altering the course of our 
delimitation towards new possibilities in the future. Thus discursive 
borders are finitizing but fluid and changeable, always in a state of tension 
and instability.5 1 While our reality is established according to these 
discursive rules, the grounding of the rules, irreducible to any absolute 
system, changes through history, changing our being along with the 
discursivities determining our being. 5 2 Thus the lack of a stable ground 
which the discourse attempts to conceal with an absolutizing but superficial 
claim, is always accompanied by the possibility for its explicitation which 
would de-stabilize the superficial hold. 
To counter its de-stabilizing pull, a discourse may sink to a conservative 
position, perpetually securing preservation for the time being, to artificially 
cover up its inner-instability by positing a foundation greater than itself—a 
main characteristic of Western metaphysical thinking which seeks to master 
the chaotic onrush of unconcealment by discovering something within it and 
grasping it as what is permanent A source of contention for Heidegger, this 
proves to be the handling of entities according to a posited mode of presence 
in terms of the most general substance or the Knowing subject5 3, rather than 
their temporal emergence which grounds them. This is taken by Heidegger 
to be a reflection on the essence of being in terms of an entity claimed astne 
absolute suprasensory truth of the totality of what is 5 4—a willful covering 
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up of its finite and multiple foundation.5 5 Similarly, metaphysics for 
Foucault is any discourse which aims to recover its own origin with which it 
can legitimately control things within its sphere, while simultaneously 
aiming to establish it as a universality upon which the generality of things 
can be established. Thus it attempts to ignore the "mad flux and anarchical 
difference", recognizing instead, the identity of things in an origin to be 
recovered.56 With the constitution of an absolute, it claims to faithfully 
retain the micro-event of the "now" beyond its temporal irruption into an a¬ 
temporal eternity which occurred in the past but will be reclaimed in the 
future in a legitimate presentation. 
One way metaphysics attempts to cover its gaps for the strengthening of 
its regime, is by positing categories in accordance with the absolute. This 
involves exclusionary rules for distinguishing truth from falsehood, which 
for Foucault, specifically entails the attachment of the effects of power-
struggles to truth. 5 7 In order to support a discourse which can cope with 
chance-events and evade material contingency, language becomes conceived 
as a plenitude of categories for resolving mner-discontinuities and subjecting 
inner-differences with rules of exclusion (division and rejection).58 Claiming 
to be a priori, categories come to establish an order upon which 
resemblances are legitimated and conceptual objectivity is guarranteed.59 
Based on this authority of categories, a space is created within which what in 
Heidegger would correspond to truth as "correctness" (Richtigkeil) according 
to a truth-falsity dichotomy, is allowed to operate.60 
Through this utilizing of the metaphysical language of categories—the 
positing of absolutes mediated by categories while exluding the 
unsubsumable as non-existent—a discursive regime desperately struggles 
against its oblivion. Foucault mentions how the temporal emergence of a 
discourse becomes metaphysically bent for the purpose of mastering its 
history with a suprahistorical perspective.61 Alluding to the same Greek 
notion of truth Heidegger speaks of (aletheia as unconcealement), Foucault 
explains how as forms of knowledge mutate through history, the truth of a 
discursive event "hardens" into what was said in the discourse, a form 
Posited as unalterably persisting through the fluctuating appearance.6 2 rom out of the discursive field where forces struggle against each other for 
the emergence of a durable relation holding them together and appearing to 
last—the "hardening" of truth—knowledge as we know it in Foucault's 
analysis, is bom to lay claim to primacy while it itself becomes subordinated 
to the discursive network for the purpose of legitimating the truth-claim 
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6 3 Foucault, "History of Systems of Thought", p. 203; & "Nietzsche, 
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p. 218; & Being And Time, p. 84. 
even if this entails "domination".63 And in Heidegger's view, everything else 
becomes reduced to a sameness ruled by the "truth" o f concepts 
presupposed a priori with concealed structures, moving towards the absence 
of any differences.6 4 This has resulted in the victory of the belief in 
permanent and universal truths, the philosophy of "truth and identity" 
autonomously standing above history as "Trum over events and difference. 
Thus according to Heidegger, being becomes forgotten in favor of an 
institutionalized consensus of truth to dominate Western thought—a form of 
life secretly devoted to an ideal (but unreal) world, a nothing, while ignoring 
the question of being itself: the mutation of being accomplished through 
language. And according to Foucault, the eventful emergence of a 
discursive configuration determining how and what we are, becomes 
forgotten in favor of its artificially established origin to delimit our way of 
being within a universalizing and eternalizing regime, disallowing any 
difference. 
In the above analysis, I have attempted to examine what are interesting 
converging points within the thoughts of Heidegger and Foucault. In both 
Heideggers ontology and Foucaulrs archaeology-genealogy, one can find a 
thinking concerning the temporal movement of a transient event which, 
whether unconcealing out of concealment as "being" or erupting-forth out of 
forces struggling for durable relations as a discursive knowledge-power 
configuration, becomes preserved as an a-temporal "thing"—a particular 
mode of being for Heidegger, a particular mode of knowledge in accordance 
with techqniques of power limiting our being for Foucault—claiming to 
persist throughout its temporal coming-to-be, transformations, and 
disappearing. For both, this proves to be an artificial preservation 
accomplished in relation to language constituting our knowledge and our 
being in terms of the universal and the eternal, the "correctness" of certainty, 
in the act of assigning a name to the unnameable. Because of the historical 
contingency of language, this tendency of obscuring the originary temporal 
event in favor of its crystallization as something durable through time, can 
continue towards a totalizing self-closure as a posited absolute for the reign 
of a discursive truth-regime over other discursive possibilities, and over 
elements placed within the discursive network, including our own being as 
subjected subjects. However, the fluidity and incompletion lying behind any 
absolute claim, also may allow for the possibility of opening up the reigning 
discursive network to the possibility of alternative and multiple ways of 
being. 
